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Abstract Several studies highlight the economic benefits
of standards, while the benefit of taking part in standard-
ization remains a rather unexplored mystery to date. In
theory, standard setters not only benefit from the possibility
to monitor and shape the development of standards but also
access a wide range of knowledge sources in the standards
committee. Therefore, we investigate how the participation
within formal standardization is related to the performance
of 1561 German companies. A Cobb-Douglas production
function is estimated in order to use the Solow-residuals as
indicator for the firm performance. Participation within
formal standardization is measured by the number of
committee seats at the German Institute for Standardization
(DIN). Our results suggest that participation within formal
standardization is positively related to firm performance in
the manufacturing sector. In the service sector, no clear
evidence for such a relationship is found. This finding also
holds true when we test if a service providers’ intellectual
property is well protected through patents.
Keywords Participation  Standardization  Firm
performance  Cobb-Douglas production function
JEL Classification L15  L25  C31
1 Introduction
Several studies suggest positive macro- (Blind and Jung-
mittag 2008; DTI 2005; Cebr 2015; Jungmittag et al. 1999)
and microeconomic benefits (for an extensive summary see
Swann 2010) of standards in general. Additionally, several
scholars explored different benefits of the well-known
quality standard ISO 9000 (Briscoe et al. 2005; Corbett et al.
2005; Pekovic and Galia 2009) and the related ISO 14000
standard on environmental management (Tien et al. 2005;
Zutshi and Sohal 2004). However, while the economic
benefit of standards seems to bewidely acknowledgedwithin
scientific literature, the benefit of taking part in standard-
ization remains a rather unexplored mystery to date. All the
above mentioned studies take the output of the standardiza-
tion process into account, i.e., the standard (stock). With
regard to the standardization process itself, the literature, on
the one hand, theoretically addresses possible benefits of the
firm’s engagement in standardization (Antonelli 1994). On
the other hand, motives or driving factors that might foster
the firm’s propensity to engage in standardization are
explored (Blind 2006b; Blind and Mangelsdorf 2016).
Consequently, the present paper aims at filling this research
gap by theoretically and empirically investigating the impact
of participation within standardization on firm performance.
Basically, two different types of standardization exist:
de jure and de facto standardization. In the latter case, the
standard arises from a standardization struggle (and
sometimes from a standard war) between different solu-
tions of different firms or coalitions (Chiesa and Toletti
2003). This paper focuses on de jure standardization that is
defined by the existence of independent organizations
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[such as the German Institute for Standardization (DIN) or
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)]
and partly by the promulgation of standards by legislative
bodies as in the case of mandated standards (David and
Greenstein 1990). However, the rather loose tag ‘‘de jure
standardization’’ actually fits only in case of mandated
standards so that we deem appropriate to use the wording
‘‘formal standardization’’. Formal standardization pro-
cesses are transparent and open to any company. Accord-
ingly, formal standards are developed in consensus with all
interested parties involved as defined within international
rules (see, e.g., ISO/IEC Directives). Every organization is
invited to join this process, but no organization is obliged
to do so. The decision whether to participate in formal
standardization or not is exclusively made at organizational
level. Thus, organizations that become involved in stan-
dardization not only bear the costs for doing so but also
derive benefits out of it that apparently exceed the costs.
In theory, standard setters not only benefit from the
possibility to monitor and shape the development of stan-
dards but also access a wide range of knowledge sources in
the standards committee. Consequently, the benefits for the
organization are manifold and can influence different profit
generating parameters. Standard setters may use standards
for the promotion of the diffusion of their innovative
products or services so that participation within standard-
ization constitutes a means of marketing. They also may
gain competitive advantages by accessing the specifica-
tions of upcoming standards prior to their publication and,
therewith, prior to competitors not involved in standard-
ization. Besides, we also consider standards committees as
a meeting point of different stakeholders (competitors,
suppliers, customers, etc.) within a specific scope. The
participants of these committees gain access to valuable
knowledge that is not necessarily codified in the upcoming
standard but shared implicitly. Hence, participation within
formal standardization also constitutes a means of knowl-
edge sourcing, which might increase an organization’s
innovativeness. Chiesa and Toletti (2003) suggest that a
single firm quite often is not able to adequately sponsor the
adoption of its technology as a standard so that collabo-
rations have to be formed. Consequently, participation
within formal standardization is used not only for the dif-
fusion of innovations but also for the generation of
knowledge. To sum up, formal standardization might
contribute to the performance of its participants in one of
the above described manners. Against this background, the
paper focuses on firms participating in formal standard-
ization and investigates how this participation contributes
to the firm’s performance. Methodologically, firm perfor-
mance is estimated using Solow residuals of a Cobb-
Douglas production function. We consider firm perfor-
mance to be an appropriate indicator to take all the above
mentioned aspects into account simultaneously and
holistically.
Within our analysis, two different types of standard
setting firms are distinguished, namely manufacturers and
service providers. The provision of services is more or less
individual, which might cause reluctance concerning
standardization. Moreover, several service industries are
still highly regulated and only some aspects seem to be
worth standardizing. Hence, standardization of services is
rather complex compared to that of products (Blind 2006a).
The analysis of the service providers’ activities within
standardization (Wakke et al. 2012) revealed that service
providers mainly use standardization for technology-re-
lated aspects, while only a minor share of service providers
actually set up service standards.
As for the technology-related activities of service pro-
viders within standardization, a further distinction can be
drawn between service providers that use technologies
from the manufacturing industries and service providers
that develop technologies themselves by means of research
and development activities (Droege and Hildebrand 2009;
Miozzo and Soete 2001). Thus, the so-called technology-
using and technology-developing service industries are
additionally distinguished in order to shed as much light as
possible on the effects of participation within formal
standardization on firm performance.
The paper is organized into five sections. The next
section briefly reviews the literature on the relation
between participation within formal standardization and
firm performance, which is the major issue of this analysis
to be covered. The third section deals with the methodol-
ogy, while the fourth section reports the statistics and the
results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the fifth section
derives implications based on the results.
2 Theory
As outlined in the introduction, formal standardization
might benefit its participants in different ways. The fol-
lowing paragraphs aim at laying out the theoretical frame
of our research. We elaborate three different aspects that
might constitute an incentive for companies to join stan-
dardization committees instead of behaving as free riders.
The three aspects, namely the leverage, the temporal, and
the network aspect, can be described as follows.
2.1 The leverage aspect
The participants of a standards committee are responsible
for specifying standards within the scope of the committee.
The technical specifications within the standard are
important elements for the successful diffusion of new
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technologies, services, and products not only domestically
but also worldwide (Blind 2006b). At firm level, standards
can be used to increase or defend market power (Lecraw
1984) by minimizing the technical distance between the
standard itself and the present technical specifications of
each firm’s current product and processes (Antonelli 1994,
p. 200). More precisely, participants may adjust the content
of the standard to their benefit in order to gain a compet-
itive advantage (Ferna´ndez et al. 2000, p. 89), to prevent
competitors from gaining advantages at their expense
(Weiss and Sirbu 1990) or to disadvantage rivals by raising
their costs (Salop and Scheffman 1983, 1987). This per-
spective is in line with the partially excludable character-
istic of standards, meaning that outsiders of the standards
committees might face considerable disadvantages when
adhering to a standard (Antonelli 1994, p. 200).
The costs of adopting a given standard (switching costs)
and the costs for participating in formal standardization
(sponsoring costs) interact with each other. In this paper, a
negative relation between the switching costs and spon-
soring costs is assumed, i.e., the more effort is put into
standardization, the less effort is needed to comply with the
requirements of the standard later on. Accordingly, par-
ticipation within standardization lowers switching costs.
Furthermore, the demand for standardized products may
be higher due to network externalities, lower transaction
costs, and enhanced diffusion rates (Antonelli 1994,
p. 201). Blind (2006b, p. 161) argues that ‘‘participation in
standardization is certainly a strategy to shape foreign
markets according to specifications of the own products or
technologies’’. Thus, manufacturers and service providers
might leverage the standardization process to boost sales
(Blind 2002). Simultaneously, owners of intellectual
property rights (IPRs) might leverage the standardization
process to increase the firm’s royalties (Berger et al. 2012;
Hyto¨nen et al. 2012). The demand increasing effect is all
the more important, the more novel the product or service
is. Standards help to overcome uncertainties embodied in
innovative technologies and therewith reduce adoption lags
of new products or services (Antonelli 1994, p. 201). In
conclusion, we assume that participation within standard-
ization raises the firm’s performance by reducing switching
costs and/or increasing demand in one of the ways
described above.
2.2 The temporal aspect
According to Blind (2006b, p. 159), the temporal aspect
can be elucidated in a way that ‘‘participants in the stan-
dardization process may have advantages compared with
outsiders, due to their early involvement in the develop-
ment of the standard’’. Simultaneously, the standard setters
can be regarded as owners of a club good (i.e., the
specifications within the standard) until the standard is
published (Antonelli 1994). Consequently, standard setters
might benefit from this temporary club good by adapting
the production process or the service provision to the
requirements of the upcoming standard before publication.
In this regard, the lead time differs and depends mainly on
the time it takes until all participants approve the final
standard for publication in consensus. A recent study by
Simcoe (2012) shows that the lead time increases the
greater the commercial interests of the committee members
are. Rent seeking is found to be a major reason for pro-
longed negotiations. Accordingly, the temporal aspect
might be decisive for ‘‘creating early knowledge’’ (Hyto¨-
nen et al. 2012, p. 2) so that participation within stan-
dardization might increase the performance of its
participants at least for a restricted time. Depending on the
delay of adoption by outsiders, performance may also
increase for a longer period.
2.3 The network aspect
Whereas both the leverage and the temporal aspect only
come into effect after publication of the standard, the
network aspect explicitly deals with the benefits resulting
from participating within a standardization committee.
Participation within standardization can be regarded as
interorganizational cooperation. According to the relational
view (Dyer and Singh 1998), cooperating firms may realize
‘‘interorganizational competitive advantages’’ based on a
joint combination of resources in unique ways. Many
scholars have extended the ‘‘standard Schumpeterian
analysis’’ (Love and Roper 1999, p. 43) and emphasize the
role of networks, communities, and linkages as alternative
to internal R&D efforts (Chesbrough 2003; Ferna´ndez et al.
2000; von Hippel 1988). More detailed, von Hippel (1988)
proves that a firm’s customers and suppliers are its main
source of innovative ideas. Ferna´ndez et al. (2000) high-
light the importance of collaborations to continuously
update different kinds of intangible assets like the tech-
nological capital. Laursen and Salter (2006) evidence the
contribution of openness to innovation performance among
British manufacturing firms. Quite similarly, Leiponen and
Helfat (2010) conclude that Finnish manufacturing firms
may improve their odds of successful innovation by
accessing a large number of knowledge sources alongside
pursuing multiple parallel objectives. Belderbos et al.
(2004) analyze the impact of different types of R&D
cooperation on firm performance differentiating between
four R&D partners (competitors, suppliers, customers, and
universities). Basically, competitor and supplier coopera-
tion increases productivity due to incremental innovations,
while customer and university cooperation is an important
knowledge source for firms pursuing radical innovations.
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According to Duysters and Lokshin (2011), however, the
positive effect of openness towards innovativeness seems
to be limited. Among Dutch companies, they proved the
existence of such a firm specific limit, above which the
marginal costs of managing the portfolio complexity
exceeds the expected benefits.
Although there is an inverse U-shape relation between
openness of a company and its innovative performance, it
seems obvious that participants within standardization
might increase their (innovative) performance due to
knowledge creation and exchange with competitors, sup-
pliers, customers, and other stakeholders in the standards
committees (Blind 2006b, p. 159). In doing so, participants
access not only explicit knowledge that is formulated in the
standard. They also access tacit knowledge, i.e. the leakage
which cannot be controlled for in the standards committee.
Thus, participation in standardization might raise the
innovativeness and therewith increase firm performance.
Hypotheses Based on these theoretical considerations, a
positive relation between the participation in formal stan-
dardization and firm performance is hypothesized (Hy-
pothesis 1).
However, we expect Hypothesis 1 to be only condi-
tionally applicable for the technology-developing service
providers. As briefly mentioned in Sect. 1, service provi-
ders mainly focus on technology-related aspects within
standardization, not on the standardization of services
(Wakke et al. 2012). These service providers focusing on
technologies either use technologies from manufacturers in
order to support their service provision or develop tech-
nologies on their own by means of research and develop-
ment. The latter come from the fields of information
technology-related services, architectural and engineering
activities or scientific research and development (Vence
and Trigo 2009; Hipp and Grupp 2005, p. 523). With
respect to these technology–developing service providers,
some of the theoretical aspects outlined above might not be
valid. These service providers might face difficulties to
benefit from the leverage aspect and the temporal aspect.
From a market perspective, technology-developing ser-
vice providers do not use the technology by themselves.
They contribute to technology development but have neg-
ligible product sales (Hyto¨nen et al. 2012). Accordingly,
they are reliant on selling the technology to manufacturers
or technology-using service providers. Hence, only if the
technology is effectively protected by intellectual property
rights (IPR), the technology-developing service providers
are able to realize profits from standard setting by
enhancing the visibility and diffusion of their technologies.
This way, they are able to generate license revenues or
similar incomes as shown by Pohlmann et al. (2015). This
assumption regarding the importance of IPR protection and
its benefits is in line with findings by Rysman and Simcoe
(2008). They show that patents are cited more often as soon
as they are disclosed to a standard setting organization in
order to be used in a standard.
Consequently, it is hypothesized that participation
within standardization of technology-developing service
providers is positively related to firm performance condi-
tional upon the adequate protection of the firm’s intellec-
tual property (Hypothesis 2).
3 Methodology
A multiple-step regression analysis is used to empiri-
cally investigate the hypothesized relations. In the first
step, the firm performance is estimated. The further steps
explore the relation between different factors (such as
the engagement in standardization) and the estimated
firm performance. As for the first step, the Solow-
residuals of a Cobb-Douglas production function are
used as proxy for the firm performance as done by van de
Wiele (2010). Olley and Pakes (1996) give another
example for the use of an unobserved residual as a
measure of productivity.
The microeconomic production function [see Eq. (1)]
uses two company-specific input factors, the number of
employees (Li) and the capital stock (Ci). The profit or
value added (Yi) serves as the output measure. The esti-
mated coefficients are normally taken as elasticity of the
respective input factor.
ln Yi ¼ a1 þ b1 ln Li þ b2 lnCi þ ei ð1Þ
However, we are not interested in the coefficients but in the
estimated error terms (ei). The error term of a regression
model aims at capturing all factors influencing the depen-
dent variable other than the regressors. More precisely, the
firm-specific error term (i.e., residual) constitutes an
appropriate performance indicator for all factors other than
the labor and capital stock (e.g., the firm’s innovativeness
or the firm’s engagement in formal standardization).
Accordingly, the error term of Eq. (1) is used as proxy for
the firm performance (PERFi).
Although the model in Eq. (1) has been called some-
what ‘‘skeletal’’ (Griliches 1995, p. 55), we consider it as a
good instrument for our purposes. Determining the correct
measures for L and C has been proven to be difficult.
Especially when calculating the capital input, it is not
always clear which factors to include and how to weigh
them (Griliches 1995). In our study, however, we do not
treat the participation in standardization as capital input
(i.e. as a kind of R&D expense). Therefore, it is convenient
for us to use this simple model as a baseline in order to be
able to concentrate on the error term as a measure for
320 J Prod Anal (2016) 45:317–330
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factors that cannot be attributed to L or C. Regarding the
results, it is important to keep in mind that other factors
than participation in standardization are also subsumed in
the Solow residual. This is why a strong theoretical back-
ground with clear assumptions is needed to explain the
outcomes (Morrison 1999).
The second stage of our regression model is a separate
step. The microeconomic production function of Eq. (1)
was merely a starting point to extract the residual. The
second step addresses those different factors that might be
related to the firm performance (PERFi) and have not been
captured by L or C. In order to determine these factors, the
hypothesized positive relation between the participation in
standardization and firm performance is tested. To explain
as much variety of the firm performance as possible,
additional factors are considered as well. We carry out the
following steps to conduct our analysis. First, the effect of
the innovativeness on firm performance is addressed.
Going back to the early work of Schumpeter (1934),
innovation has been recognized as a key element of com-
petition. Innovative companies gain market shares from
non-innovators. Consequently, scholars evidenced a posi-
tive effect of innovation (Cre´pon et al. 1998) or corporate
R&D (Kumbhakar et al. 2012) on performance or pro-
ductivity. However, meanwhile this one-way causality
seems to turn into a ‘‘self-reinforcing virtuous circle
between innovation and economic performance at firm
level’’ (Cainelli et al. 2006, p. 454). A similar result is
found by Koellinger (2008), who analyzes 7302 European
enterprises and comes to the result that service as well as
product innovation is positively associated with prof-
itability, although the direction of the causality is
ambiguous. Artz et al. (2010) evidence a positive relation
between product announcements and two measures for the
firm performance, return on assets and sales growth. An
unexpected negative relationship between patents and firm
performance is revealed as well. However, they argue that
this result stems from an increased strategic patenting at
firm level. Nevertheless, the possible effects of the firm’s
innovativeness on firm performance are addressed within
our second stage regression. The patent stock of each firm
is used as proxy for the innovativeness. In addition, the
patent stock is used for measuring the protection of intel-
lectual properties in order to test our second hypothesis.
Second, the size of a company might influence its per-
formance. According to Tsai (2005), both large and small
firms have higher competitive advantages with respect to
the R&D productivity than middle sized companies. Dha-
wan (2001) first gives a short overview of the literature
regarding the relationship between firm size and profit rate
which slightly tends towards a decline with firm size before
empirical evidence is found that larger US firms are less
productive than their smaller counterparts. Irrespective of
the different results, firm size might affect firm perfor-
mance. Accordingly, the second stage allows for this pos-
sible effect. We anticipate a U-shaped relationship that is
estimated by the inclusion of a squared term of the size
variable, which is expressed by the number of employees.1
Third, we consider export as another factor that is
probably related to the performance of a firm. As in the
case of innovative companies, the available literature in
this field considers a bidirectional relationship between
export activities and firm performance. In this regard,
two different patterns, ‘‘self-selection’’ and ‘‘learning-
by-exporting’’, are under investigation (Kneller and Pisu
2010; Manez-Castillejo et al. 2010). The former pattern
deals with the self-selection of companies into export
markets, i.e., only the ex-ante more efficient companies
enter foreign markets. The latter pattern addresses the
effect of export on productivity, i.e., exporters are more
productive than non-exporters. Kneller and Pisu (2010)
evidence the effect of export on productivity among UK
firms across a wide range of performance indicators
(sales growth, profitability growth as well as several
innovation indicators). Following this line of argumen-
tation, the effect of exporting activities on firm perfor-
mance is tested.
Fourth, we control for firm performance in the past in
order to capture other unobserved factors like management
skills for which we have no data.
Finally, we control for differences between the more or
less heterogeneous industries alongside the differentiation
between the manufacturing and the service industries in
general. Considering all of the above mentioned control
variables, we end up with the following model [Eq. (2)] for
a nonlinear relationship between company size and firm
performance:
PERFi ¼ aþ b1PARTi þ b2INNOi þ b3SIZEi
þ b4ðSIZEiÞ2 þ b5EXPi þ b6PASTi þ b7Xi þ ei
ð2Þ
with PERF = the firm performance estimated by Eq. (1),
PART = the participation level in formal standardization,
INNO = the innovativeness of the firm, SIZE = the size of
the firm, EXP = the export activity of the firm,
PAST = past firm performance, X = a vector of industry
dummies based on the two-digit NACE code.
In order to explicitly test the effect of the right hand side
(RHS) variables of Eq. (2) on the firm performance that is
estimated for the year 2009, we use appropriate time-lags
for the independent variables. More details in this regard
will be provided in the statistics section.
1 A linear relationship was also tested but performed less well. This
holds true for all nonlinear model specifications we use.
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However, the literature on factors that influence the
companies’ decision to join standardization (Blind 2006b;
Wakke et al. 2015) heavily suggests interactions between
the participation level PART and the other RHS variables in
Eq. (2). When estimating a multiple regression model with
correlation among the RHS variables, also called multi-
collinearity, the overall explanatory power of the model is
not compromised. The individual coefficient estimates may
not be correct, however. Moreover, these reciprocal
dependencies may lead to endogeneity due to a simul-
taneity bias. Consequently, these issues are taken into
account by performing a multiple-step procedure as simi-
larly suggested by Cre´pon et al. (1998). We conduct one
more step before estimating Eq. (2). In this intermediate
step we regress the participation level PART on all the
remaining RHS variables as shown in Eq. (3).
We again allow for a non-linear relationship between the
innovativeness and the participation level as proved by
Blind (2006b) at company level and Blind (2002) at
industry level. For reasons of unintended knowledge spil-
lovers especially to competitors, highly innovative com-
panies or industries might stay away from standardization.
PARTi ¼ aþ b1INNOi þ b2ðINNOiÞ2 þ b3SIZEi
þ b4EXPi þ b5PASTi þ b6Xi þ ei ð3Þ
Once again, we use the estimated error terms (ei), i.e., in
this case the participation level of a company independent
of its innovativeness, size, export activities, and industry
specific peculiarities. The new variable [the error term of
Eq. (3)] is called participation intensity (PAINi). Equa-
tion (2) is adjusted (PARTi is replaced by PAINi), which
leads us to the following equation:
PERFi ¼ aþ b1PAINi þ b2INNOi þ b3SIZEi
þ b4ðSIZEiÞ2 þ b5EXPi þ b6PASTi þ b7Xi þ ei
ð4Þ
as mentioned in the introduction, the two most prominent
types of service providers are distinguished within the model
dealing explicitly with the service industries: technology-
users and technology-developers. In order to test the hypoth-
esized differences (Hypothesis 1 for the technology-using and
Hypothesis 2 for the technology-developing service provi-
ders), a dummy variable (TECHi) that identifies the technol-
ogy-developing service providers is set up. This dummy and
an interaction term of this dummy with the participation
intensity PAINið Þ are included in Eq. (4). Moreover, an
interaction between the dummy variable (TECHi), the par-
ticipation intensity (PAINi), and the innovativeness (INNOi)
allows for testing our second hypothesis. Integrating these
three factors into Eq. (4) leads us to the following regression
model for studying peculiarities within the service industry:
PERFi ¼ aþ b1PAINi þ b2ðPAINi  TECHiÞ
þ b3ðPAINi  TECHi  INNOiÞ þ b4TECHi
þ b5INNOi þ b6SIZEi þ b7ðSIZEiÞ2 þ b8EXPi
þ b9PASTi þ b10Xi þ ei
ð5Þ
using the methodology described above, we end up with
three steps. First, the firm performance (PERFi) is esti-
mated by applying Eq. (1) to the data. Second, the partic-
ipation intensity (PAINi) is estimated by applying Eq. (3).
Third, Eqs. (4) and (5) are estimated using the estimates of
the first and second step.
Alongside this parametric approach, in which we perform
several OLS-regression analyses, the non-parametric boot-
strap method is used. This approach checks the reliability of
our results by checking the validity of our point estimates.
Bootstrapping means constructing a sampling distribution
based on randomsamplingwith replacement from the original
data instead of making distributional assumptions for
hypothesis testing as in the case of parametric statistics
(Friedman and Friedman 1995). This is necessary because
econometrically the underlying distribution, i.e. the real pro-
duction frontier, of our third step equations is not clear. Thus it
is not clear if the results are merely random outcomes origi-
nating from the underlying data. A similar bootstrapping
procedure has, e.g., been developed by Simar and Wilson
(1999). They use bootstrapping to validate the estimates of
Malmquist indices,which also suffer from the lack of a known
underlying distribution function. Consequently, the data is
resampled and the resamples or pseudo-samples are used to
perform the above describedmethodology in order to validate
the coefficients estimates. The number of resamples is chosen
to be big enough to produce reliable results on significance
levels of up to 0.001. The system bootstrapping with 19,999
replications leads to 19,999 estimates for the effect of the
participation intensity (PAINi) on firm performance, i.e.,
19,999 values for the respective coefficient b1 of Eq. (4) and
for the coefficients b1, b2 and b3 of Eq. (5). Additionally, the
coefficient of the INNO variable as well as the coefficients of
several interaction terms to be introduced later are boot-
strapped. In a final step, the sampling distribution of the
coefficients is described in order to derive conclusions with
regard to our hypotheses. The following section describes our
sample and applies the methodology to the data.
4 Statistics and results
Our sample is based on the Hoppenstedt database, which
provides basic information of German companies. Prior to
applying our methodology, the sample is corrected for
322 J Prod Anal (2016) 45:317–330
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outliers by excluding observations ± 4.0 standard devia-
tions (SD) away from the mean for each of the variables as
suggested by Cohen et al. (2003). Even though the Hop-
penstedt database provides access to more than 300,000
company profiles, only for 1561 of these companies all
variables required for our analysis are available. The
sample consists of 823 service providers and 738 manu-
facturers. The decision whether a company is assigned to
the service industries or manufacturing industries is made
by considering all NACE (Statistical Classification of
Economic Activities in the European Community) classi-
fications provided by the Hoppenstedt database.
In order to make the distinction of the main NACE
classification more accurate, two further conditions are
imposed for the purpose of detecting service providers. The
main NACE classification and the majority of all subor-
dinated NACE classifications of each organization have to
be within the NACE divisions above 44 to be assigned to
the service industries. Table 1 provides the industrial
structure of the sample following the NACE classification.
Moreover, to give and idea of the structure of the German
economy, the gross value added by each sector in 2008 and
its share in the total gross value added were included.
Roughly one third of the total value added is created by the
industry sector, the primary sector accounts for only one
percent. The biggest part of two thirds is to be attributed to
the service sector. Our sample matches roughly the overall
sector composition in Germany. ‘‘Manufacturing’’,
‘‘wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and
motorcycles’’, and ‘‘financial and insurance activities’’ are
somewhat overrepresented while ‘‘real estate activities’’ is
underrepresented. This will, however, not have any nega-
tive impact on our findings as they concern firm level
without trying to make a statement about the economy as a
whole. Hence, it is of greatest importance to use as many
observations as possibly available. Using a random sample
will also help us to avoid a sample selection bias in our
model regarding the variables participation in standard-
ization and for the measure of innovativeness. Our sample
both includes companies that hold seats in participation
committees and that do patent as well as companies, which
do not engage in those activities (Cre´pon et al. 1998; Hall
et al. 2009).
The level of participation in standardization is measured
by the number of committee seats that every company held
at DIN in early 2010. Unfortunately, no earlier data was
Table 1 Industrial structure of the sample
Industry Number of
observations
Percentage
(%)
Gross value added (2008,
billion Euro)
Percentage
(%)
Manufacturing 500 32.0 492,100 22.20
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and
motorcycles
243 15.6 220,910 9.96
Financial and insurance activities 120 7.7 83,640 3.77
Professional, scientific and technical activities 114 7.3 147,430 6.65
Human health and social work activities 111 7.1 150,680 6.80
Construction 97 6.2 93,320 4.21
Information and communication 70 4.5 87,260 3.94
Transporting and storage 65 4.2 95,960 4.33
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 60 3.8 51,940 2.34
Real estate activities 56 3.6 266,450 12.02
Administrative and support service activities 42 2.7 110,730 4.99
Water supply; sewerage; waste management and
remediation activities
25 1.6 24,160 1.09
Other service activities 12 0.8 61,750 2.79
Accommodation and food service activities 11 0.7 35,610 1.61
Public administration and defense; compulsory social
security
10 0.6 132,080 5.96
Education 9 0.6 96,590 4.36
Arts, entertainment and recreation 8 0.5 31,940 1.44
Mining and quarrying 7 0.4 6570 0.30
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1 0.1 21,190 0.96
Source for value added: German Federal Statistical Office. Does not add up to 100 % because gross value added by private households was left
out
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accessible. Only full expert status, i.e., no temporary
engagement (e.g., visitor status), is considered. It can,
therefore, be assumed that all companies have participated
in standardization for at least one year, which is supported
by the low level of fluctuation found by comparing most
recent data of involvement in 2011 with the data from
2010.
Innovativeness is measured by the stock of national,
European and international patents calculated from 2000 to
2008 by the perpetual inventory method with a constant
depreciation rate (15 percent) as being well described by
Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010). The matching of the patent
stock to the firms is achieved by comparison of company
names and addresses. Certainly, this rather technical
innovation indicator does not fully capture the various
forms of innovation in the service industries and scholars
have meanwhile developed more appropriate indicators in
this regard (Schmoch and Gauch 2009; Gotsch and Hipp
2012). However, service providers use standardization
mainly for technology-related innovation activities (Wakke
et al. 2012) so that we regard patents as an appropriate
indicator for innovation within our sample. The dummy
variable that differentiates between technology-developing
and technology-using service providers is built based on
the main NACE classification. Service providers primarily
classified within NACE 2.0 division 62, 63, 71 or 72 were
assigned to the technology-developing service providers.
This approach is based on the literature (Glueckler and
Hammer 2011; Hipp and Grupp 2005, p. 523; Vence and
Trigo 2009). Table 2 provides a summary of all variables
including a short description, the measurement, and the
source.
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for all vari-
ables that entered the analysis. With regard to the entire
Hoppenstedt database (see last column in Table 3), our
sample is slightly skewed towards the larger companies
caused by the restricted data availability of the smaller
companies. However, the regression model controls for the
company size so that this possible bias is taken into
account. Based on the tendency towards larger companies
in our dataset, one might expect that standardization
(PARTi) and innovation activities (INNOi) (that are not
gathered through Hoppenstedt) are above average and
therewith do not adequately represent the population of
German companies. Yet the average number of committee
seats of the standard setters in our dataset (2.1 seats) is
below the average number of seats held by German stan-
dard setting companies (3.7 seats). Moreover, the average
patent stock of the patent holders in our sample (5.0
patents) is below the average patent stock of German patent
holding companies (31.2 patents).
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the Cobb-
Douglas production function [Eq. (1)]. It is noteworthy that
the coefficients for Ln L and Ln C do not add up to 1. This
indicates that, as expected, Eq. (1) cannot serve as a proper
indicator for firm performance on its own. As we concen-
trate on the use of the residuals of these estimations, the
results are still usable for our purposes.
A potential omitted-variable bias is being accounted for
further below. The error terms of the two models are used
to build the new variable firm performance (PERFi) as
described in Sect. 3. Figure 1 plots the histogram of the
firm performance (PERFi), i.e., the (Solow) residuals of
Eq. (1).
Table 2 Variables
Variable Description Measure Source
Y Profit Profit realized in 2009 (million Euro) Hoppenstedt database
L Number of employees Number of employees in 2009 Hoppenstedt database
C Capital stock Nominal capital (million Euro) Hoppenstedt database
PART Participation level Number of committee seats within the German Institute for
Standardization
DIN German Institute for
Standardization
INNO Innovativeness Patent stock in 2000-2008 divided by the number of employees PATSTAT database
SIZE Number of employees Natural logarithm of the number of employees in 2008 Hoppenstedt database
EXP Export 1 if the company sells products outside Germany; 0 otherwise Hoppenstedt database
PAST Past firm performance Profit realized in 2008 (million Euro) divided by the number of
employees in 2008
Hoppenstedt database
PAIN Participation intensity Error term of Eq. (3) Own calculation
PERF Firm performance Error term of Eq. (1) Own calculation
TECH Technology-developing
service providers
1 if service provider is classified within NACE 2.0 division 62, 63,
71 or 72; 0 otherwise
Hoppenstedt database
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In the second step, the standardization intensity (PAINi)
is estimated by applying Eq. (3) to the data (see Table 5).
Finally, these results are used to estimate the effects of all
the independent variables on the firm performance as
described by Eqs. (4) and (5). Table 6 provides the results
that we are eventually interested in.
Our basic model specification is reported in columns (1)
and (2) of Table 6. The regression results support
Hypothesis 1 for manufacturers and within the aggregated
model. The participation intensity (PAINi) is able to
significantly and positively explain the firm performance,
which confirms the hypothesized positive relationship
between participation in standardization and firm perfor-
mance. Participation in formal standardization is able to
explain up to one percent of the firm performance. For the
service industries, no significant positive relation between
participation intensity and firm performance is estimated.
Alongside the parametric regression analyses, the data-
set is bootstrapped as described above. This additional step
aims at reducing a possible bias caused by the fact that the
dependent variable (PERFi) is not observed but estimated,
which might harm inference. Therefore, a sampling dis-
tribution of the coefficients of the PAIN and INNO vari-
ables of Eqs. (4) and (5) as well as of the two coefficients
of interest of the interaction terms in Eq. (5) is drawn. The
lower rows of the table report the characteristic features
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Service providers (N = 823) Manufacturers (N = 738) Hoppenstedt
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Ln Y -0.454 2.123 -0.154 1.845 -0.131 1.931
Ln L -4.599 1.737 -4.549 1.232 -2.995 1.338
Ln C -0.019 2.618 -0.016 2.009 -2.519 1.692
PART -0.063 0.501 -0.176 0.660 – –
INNO -0.008 0.185 -0.009 0.069 – –
SIZE -4.574 1.734 -4.553 1.225 -3.002 1.341
EXP -0.074 0.262 -0.293 0.455 -0.065 0.246
TECH -0.094 0.291 – – – –
Table 4 Estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production function
[Eq. (1)]
Y = ln Y Service provider Manufacturer
-(1) (2)
Ln L -0.295*** -0.272***
(7.75) (5.44)
Ln C -0.318*** -0.376***
(12.60) (12.28)
Constant -1.817*** -1.386***
(-9.76) (-5.90)
R2 26.5 % 24.0 %
Obs. 823 738
The asterisks represent the levels of significance: ***\ 0.001,
**\ 0.01, *\ 0.05 and \ 0.1. T-values in parentheses
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Fig. 1 Histogram of the Solow residuals in terms of the standard
deviation (SD)
Table 5 Estimation of Eq. (3) (Step 2)
Y = PART Service provider Manufacturer
(1) (2)
SIZE 0.16*** 0.18***
(0.58) (4.60)
INNO 0.58 0.42***
(1.32) (3.97)
(INNO)2 -0.59 -0.38***
(-1.36) (-3.52)
EXP -0.03 0.07
(-0.77) (1.87)
PAST -0.02 0.03
(-0.50) (0.83)
R2 10.6 % 14.9 %
Obs. 823 738
The asterisks represent the levels of significance: ***\ 0.001,
**\ 0.01, *\ 0.05 and \ 0.1. T-values in parentheses. All
regression models include 42 service industry dummies which are not
reported here; reference industry (omitted category): NACE 2.0
division 46 ‘‘Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and
motorcycles’’
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Table 6 Estimations of
Eqs. (4) and (5) (Step 3)
Y = PERF Equations (4) Equations (4)
Service provider Manufacturer Service provider
(1) (2) (3)
PAIN 0.05 0.07* 0.16**
(1.43) (2.41) (3.34)
PAIN 9 TECH – – -0.16***
(-3.71)
PAIN 9 TECH 9 INNO – – 0.06**
(3.01)
TECH – – 0.13***
(3.86)
INNO 0.05*** 0.05* 0.05***
(5.75) (2.46) (6.66)
EXP 0.01 -0.05 0.01
(0.51) (-1.18) (0.26)
SIZE -0.02 -0.54*** 0.01
(-0.08) (-3.64) (.0.04)
(SIZE)2 0.15* 0.61*** 0.13*
(1.08) (4.44) (0.94)
PAST 0.19*** 0.12** 0.19***
(4.08) (2.70) (4.15)
R2 16.9 % 15.9 % 17.9 %
Obs. 823 738 823
Results of bootstrapping
PAIN
Mean 0.19 0.18 0.61
SD 0.16 0.08 0.28
5 % Perc. -0.05 0.05 0.23
95 % Perc. 0.46 0.30 1.07
PAIN 9 TECH [Eq. (5)]
Mean – – -0.81
SD – – -0.50
5 % Perc. – – -1.56
95 % Perc. – – -0.31
PAIN 9 TECH 9 INNO [Eq. (5)]
Mean – – 2.22
SD – – 390.35
5 % Perc. – – -73.38
95 % Perc. – – 47.50
INNO
Mean -0.05 1.85 0.06
SD 5.95 1.71 5.65
5 % Perc. -7.46 0.45 -6.90
95 % Perc. 3.63 5.49 3.58
The asterisks represent the levels of significance: ***\ 0.001, **\ 0.01, *\ 0.05 and \ 0.1. T-values
in parentheses. All regression models include 42 service industry dummies which are not reported here;
reference industry (omitted category): NACE 2.0 division 46 ‘‘Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles
and motorcycles’’
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(mean, SD, the 5th and the 95th percentile) of these sam-
pling distributions (see e.g. Assaf et al. 2011; Barros and
Garcia-del-Barrio 2011; Gitto and Mancuso 2012 for the
practical application of the bootstrapping procedure.).
The results for the basic model specification are sup-
ported by the sampling distributions. The coefficient of
PAIN for the service providers changes its sign at the 5 %
percentile. Therefore a clear interpretation is impossible.
The sampling distribution shows that there is no clear
direction of the effect. For the manufacturers the coeffi-
cient keeps its sign and therefore has a clear direction of
influence as it was found with the parametric regression.
We also control specifically for the INNO term. Again,
there is no clear effect for the service providers. Innova-
tiveness has, however, a clear positive effect on the per-
formance of manufacturers. This is supported by the
bootstrapping sampling distribution.
As mentioned in Sect. 2, we further differentiate
between technology-developing and technology-using ser-
vice providers by applying Eq. (5) to the data. Column (3)
presents the results in this regard.
As for the technology-using service providers (i.e.,
without the interaction terms), the results suggest a positive
and significant relationship between participation intensity
and firm performance as hypothesized (Hypothesis 1). As
for the technology-developing service providers (i.e.,
TECHi ¼ 1Þ; the second term (PAINi 9 TECHi) cancels
out the first term (PAINi). Thus, participation intensity and
firm performance are negatively related as long as the third
term ðPAINi  TECHi  INNOiÞ does not affect the rela-
tionship (i.e., no or low innovativeness).
However, both variables containing INNO in Eq. (5)
have no significant effect on firm performance when con-
sidering the results of the bootstrap. Therefore, the second
hypothesis cannot be confirmed. As innovativeness is
measured by the patent stock, we are able to draw con-
clusions concerning the protection of intellectual property
from these results. The coefficient of ðPAINi  TECHi 
INNOiÞ is clearly not significant as indicated by the high
standard deviation in the sampling distribution. Therefore,
in contrast to our assumption, protection of intellectual
property is no clear condition for technology-developing
service providers to participate in standardization. More-
over, innovativeness as measured by the single INNO term
does again prove not to be significant in the service sector.
For the sake of robustness, the models were additionally
estimated with a binary dummy reflecting whether a
company participates in standardization or not. Using this
proxy instead of the participation intensity based on the
number of committee seats within DIN, similar results are
found. Moreover, another source of potential endogeneity
within the estimation of the firm performance is taken into
account. Equation (1) certainly suffers from an omitted-
variable bias that might cause endogeneity as can be seen
from the regression results in Table 4. Therefore, Eqs. (4)
and (5) are additionally estimated using profit (ln Yi)
instead of the estimated firm performance as dependent
variable. With this specification very similar results to
those of our main regressions are found.
As an additional test, we performed the regression in the
basic model specification after replacing PAIN with PART.
The results are reported in Table 7. For the estimates of
Eq. (4) there is no difference in the results. Concerning the
results for Eq. (5), the PART*TECH*INNO interaction
term loses its significance in the parametric regression.
This is straightforward because PART is dependent on
INNO as shown in Eq. (3). Therefore, no idiosyncratic
effect of INNO can be shown using PART. This indicates
that it was the right decision to construct the PAIN variable
in order to be able to single out specific effects that would
otherwise have been lost due to reciprocal dependencies.
The bootstrapping results support these findings.
Lastly, we tested several further model specifications.
The omission of the PAST variable did not alter the results
but lower the R2. Entering INNO or PAIN logarithmically
did not yield usable results because in these cases a great
amount of observations were lost due to too many zeros
and negative values in the sample. We enhanced the
models by entering additional interaction terms, namely
PAIN*INNO, PAIN*SIZE and PAIN*PAST. Testing their
coefficients with the bootstrap method showed that they did
not have any explanatory power.
5 Implications and limitations
In conclusion, a positive and significant relation between
the intensity of participation in standardization and the
firm performance is evidenced in manufacturing. This
result seems to be robust to several company and industry
specific factors as well as to numerous alternative model
specifications. All relevant econometric issues such as a
sample selections bias and endogeneity due to simul-
taneity as well as due to an omitted variable bias are
accounted for. Thus, we uncovered a first indication for
the microeconomic benefit of taking part in formal stan-
dardization. This implication rests upon the following
trains of thoughts. First, a company always tries to max-
imize firm performance. Thus, if a company would not
experience a benefit from taking part in formal standard-
ization, the company would not get engaged in standard-
ization any longer. Second, based on our results one could
argue the other way around insofar as only better per-
forming companies get engaged in formal standardization,
which would also explain the positive relation. However,
we refuse this reasoning, because it does not seem logical
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that only better performing companies should get engaged
in formal standardization, when participation in formal
standardization would not benefit these companies.
Consequently, we encourage managers to exploit the
microeconomic benefit of participation within standard-
ization whenever possible.
Table 7 Estimations of
Eqs. (4) and (5) using PART
(Step 3)
Y = PERF Equation (4) Equation (5)
Service provider Manufacturer Service provider
(1) (2) (3)
PART 0.05 0.08* 0.17**
(1.40) (2.54) (3.33)
PART 9 TECH – – -0.16***
– – (-3.55)
PART 9 TECH 9 INNO – – 0.01
– – (0.51)
TECH – – 0.14***
(3.86)
INNO 0.05*** 0.04* 0.05***
(5.74) (2.45) (5.97)
EXP 0.02 -0.05 0.01
(0.56) (-1.30) (0.41)
SIZE -0.02 -0.55*** -0.02
(-0.14) (-3.77) (-0.13)
(SIZE)2 0.15 0.62*** 0.13
(1.08) (4.47) (0.94)
PAST 0.20*** 0.12** 0.20***
(4.08) (2.70) (4.15)
R2 16.9 % 16.0 % 17.7 %
Obs. 823 738 823
Results of bootstrapping
PART
Mean 0.19 0.18 0.62
SD 0.16 0.08 0.28
5 % Perc. -0.05 0.06 0.25
95 % Perc. 0.45 0.31 1.08
PART 9 TECH [Eq. (5)]
Mean – – -0.85
SD – – 0.43
5 % Perc. – – -1.77
95 % Perc. – – -0.35
PART 9 TECH 9 INNO [Eq. (5)]
Mean – – -2.46
SD – – 25.80
5 % Perc. – – -51.73
95 % Perc. – – 37.57
INNO
Mean -.40 1.54 -0.67
SD 5.77 1.52 6.08
5 % Perc. -7.76 0.27 -8.60
95 % Perc. 2.45 4.63 1.83
The asterisks represent the levels of significance: ***\ 0.001, **\ 0.01, *\ 0.05 and \ 0.1. All
regression models include 42 service industry dummies which are not reported here; reference industry
(omitted category): NACE 2.0 division 46 ‘‘Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles’’
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As for the standard developing organizations, these
results might be used to justify tariffs (necessary to fund
the administrative organization of standardization) to the
standard setters. Given the already acknowledged positive
effects of standards on the demand-side of standardization,
an increase in the participation intensity on the supply-side
would even further expedite the acceptance of future
standards and, therewith, the economic and societal bene-
fits of standards including sustainability issues. Conse-
quently, the paper’s findings might contribute to the
promotion of the entire standardization system.
With regard to the consideration of the service indus-
tries, a clear relation between the engagement in stan-
dardization and firm performance is not evidenced. This
holds true for both technology-using and technology-de-
veloping service providers. In the special case of the latter
we find no evidence that supports our second hypothesis.
The participation in standardization of technology-de-
veloping service providers is not conditional upon the
protection of their intellectual property. Service providers
seem generally not to be able to profit from the leverage,
temporal or network effects of the participation in stan-
dardization. This supports our assumption that to date
service providers do not use standardization for service
technologies but rather use standardization for technolo-
gies from the manufacturing sector (Wakke et al. 2012).
As standardization is not used in the key field of business,
this might explain the missing influence on firm
performance.
Based on our results, we see a couple of promising
research directions for the future. First of all, the findings
only give a first indication for the benefit of participation in
standardization. The validation of these findings including
more advanced analyses should motivate future research.
Especially the causality issue, which is not yet adequately
explored in this paper, might be of interest for other
scholars. In this regard, there is still the risk that the par-
ticipation variable picks up omitted effects so that endo-
geneity might still be prevalent. Moreover, this research
does not allow for long-term predictions about a possible
benefit of continuously taking part in standardization.
Finally, the role of the service sectors in standardization
might be further explored. In doing so, other determinants
for the participation in standardization than those discussed
here can be considered in order to clarify the incentives for
service providers.
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